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Recent events in America show that voters are increasingly the victim of misinformation, especially over issues such
as President Obama’s birth certificate and the Affordable Care Act. Here, Jennifer Hochschild and Katherine
Levine Einstein show that misinformation is rife in America, and propose a number of smaller remedies to at least
help improve voter literacy and counter ignorance.
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It is painfully easy to demonstrate Americans’—and others’—ignorance about politically relevant facts. Fewer than
one third of high school students in the United States knew in the 1980s which half century witnessed the American
Civil War,  and only two-thirds could find France on a map. In 2000, four out of five whites and nine out of ten blacks
did not know what share of the American population was  African American. Nor are residents of the United States
unique in their political ignorance. In 2004, 45 percent of a nationally representative sample of Britons, including
more than three fifths of those under age 35, had never heard of Auschwitz. And yet, to quote Horace Mann – only
one of the many authorities who have made the same point – an educated public “is requisite for the faithful and
conscientious discharge of all those duties which devolve upon the inheritor of a portion of the sovereignty of this
great republic.”
Arguably even more problematic than political ignorance, and less well understood, is widely-shared misinformation.
In our book, Do Facts Matter? Information and Misinformation in American Politics, we use the case of the
Affordable Care Act (ACA), among several others, to illustrate and explain the consequences of political
misinformation. Repeated polls on the ACA, also known as Obamacare, enable one to trace the trajectory of
misinformation over time. In April 2010, over half of American respondents agreed, appropriately, that they were
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“confused” about the new law and that they lacked enough information “to understand how it would impact [them]
personally” [all evidence on the ACA is from the Kaiser Family Foundation Health Tracking Polls].  Nonetheless,
many already believed false information; up to a third—in most cases more than said “don’t know”- agreed that the
ACA did not include various provisions that it in fact includes.
Over the next few years, the proportion of respondents making this type of mistake increased, as did the share of
respondents claiming that the law does include provisions which in fact are not in it. Many provisions that
respondents mistakenly thought were excluded—such as insurance coverage for young adults or for people with
pre-existing conditions – appealed to them, and many provisions that respondents mistakenly thought were includes
– such as death panels, cuts in Medicare, and insurance for undocumented immigrants–were deeply distasteful. 
Furthermore, compared with correctly informed survey respondents, more than twice as many of the misinformed
told pollsters that they would vote against a member of Congress who supported the law.  In combination, those
patterns show that many of the misinformed held policy and political views antithetical to their own descriptions of
their interests and preferences.
The most recent poll of March 2015 showed little change in the proportion of respondents misinformed about the
ACA. A quarter still said that the law does not encourage expansion of Medicaid, and three tenths still said that it
does not subsidize insurance coverage for the poor and near-poor.  In June 2015, two-fifths incorrectly stated that
the Supreme Court had not yet ruled on a challenge to the ACA, and 4 percent knew of the ruling but thought the
dissenters had won.
Knowing a person’s political partisanship or ideology permits a fairly good prediction of whether they hold a given
piece of wrong factual “knowledge” and correspondingly mistaken policy views. Well over half of Republicans, and
just over half of conservatives, held false beliefs about the ACA in June 2010 and planned to vote in accord with
their representative’s position on the law. Fewer than a quarter of independents, a tenth of Democrats, and only a
few moderates and liberals were in the same analytical space.
Furthermore, this imbalance is not a matter of general ignorance; Republicans who hold false factual beliefs and are
politically engaged around this issue are unusually well-educated. Democrats with a college degree are much less
likely than less- educated Democrats to be mistaken about the ACA and to plan to use their views in their vote
choice. In contrast, Republicans with a college degree are much more likely than those without to be mistaken about
the ACA and to plan to use their views in their vote choice.  Fully three-fifths of well-educated Republicans are in that
group.
We cannot say whether highly educated Republicans oppose the ACA and its proponents because they are
misinformed, or are misinformed because they oppose the ACA and its proponents, or are both misinformed and
opposed because of some other reason such as fear. But we can point to a large number of Americans whose good
schooling has not inoculated them against holding and using mistaken understandings.
Finding strong correlations among partisanship, information, and policy preferences is hardly novel in political
science. However, these interconnections matter politically in ways that were insufficiently explored before we
published Do Facts Matter?, because they create strong incentives for politicians to discourage abandonment of
misinformation in favour of correct knowledge.  That is, citizens’ political use of misinformation creates an
asymmetry among political activists.
Consider the use of misinformation from a politician’s vantage point. A potential voter who is misinformed but holds
policy or political views that accord with his or her misinformation is in a very stable state.  The person “knows”
something important, uses this “knowledge,” and is connected with a political party and leaders who reinforce, or at
least seldom contradict, this “knowledge.” Many of the person’s friends or members of the group with which he or
she identifies probably concur with it. Furthermore, inertia is powerful, so a change in political views is always less
likely than persistence.  To persuade this potential voter to reject false knowledge, change policy views, disagree
with friends, perhaps abandon leaders or even a political party, requires an enormous amount of effort and
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resources – inevitably in short supply in a political campaign.
Thus leaders of one political party – Democrats in the case of the ACA – have little incentive to try to persuade
people holding and using factual misinformation to change their minds and behaviours. Conversely, leaders of the
other political party – Republicans in this case – have a powerful incentive to keep individuals misinformed and
active, or at least no reason to try very hard to inform them that they are wrong. As the political consultant Lee
Atwater is supposed to have said, “Politics and facts don’t belong in the same room.”
This logic extends beyond the case of health insurance. Do Facts Matter? uses a variety of cases – global warming,
Justice Clarence Thomas’ confirmation hearings,  weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, President Clinton’s affair
with Monica Lewinski, opposition to childhood vaccination, the “birther” movement (the belief that President Obama
was born outside the United States), and others– to show how the failure to use correct information in the political
arena, and especially the use of political misinformation, is damaging in a wide range of contexts.  Do Facts
Matter?  also expands on the discussion of politicians’ incentives to foster, or at least not correct, voters’ active use of
political misinformation.
The issue should matter to many people beyond frustrated professors of political science; using political
misinformation in elections and policy making can lead to deaths in a way that “mere” political ignorance seldom
does.  After all, Americans who mistakenly accepted politicians’ insistence that Iraq harbored weapons of mass
destruction were especially likely in 2003 to endorse a war in which hundreds of thousands were killed.  More
insidiously, the active use of misinformation can undermine democratic governance, by inhibiting the “faithful and
conscientious discharge of all those duties which devolve upon the inheritor of a portion of the sovereignty of [a]
great republic.”
Luckily, there are some responses, which we explore in some detail in Do Facts Matter? The book discusses ways
of dealing with misinformation that range from education (in classrooms, the media, or even blog posts), “nudges, ”
political activism, and fact checkers, through reliance on experts to make decisions, all the way to policy mandates
that reject popular preferences. As Do Facts Matter? points out, none of these responses are fully effective and all
are weak in the face of a stable, gratifying intersection among false information, corresponding policy views,
connection with like-minded others, and reinforcing politicians. But at least they are worth trying.
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